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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Rebeca Pérez  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Accounting 
 
June 2017 
 
Title: Individual Executive Characteristics and Firm Performance: Evidence from CEO 
Narcissism 
 
 
Narcissism refers to persistent feelings of grandiosity, a need for admiration, and a 
lack of empathy (American Psychiatric Association 2013). The literature has found 
narcissism to be associated with individuals making decisions for a firm that fulfill their 
egos rather than maximize firm value. The literature in psychology, however, suggests 
that when firms face financial distress, narcissism could be a desirable trait in an 
individual, enabling the CEO to take the necessary risks and make the necessary 
decisions for the firm to recover. I study the context under which a firm may benefit from 
a narcissistic CEO. In this study, I use two measures from prior literature (CEO photo 
prominence in the annual report and a CEO’s use of first-person personal pronouns) to 
form a combination measure to investigate whether firms in financial distress are more 
likely to appoint a CEO with more narcissistic traits. I find some evidence to support this 
hypothesis. I also examine whether the association between narcissism and future firm 
performance is affected by the economic conditions of a firm and the visibility of the 
firm. I find results consistent with firm financial distress increasing a narcissistic CEO’s 
effect on firm performance in low-visibility firms.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
Narcissism is a personality disorder generally defined as “a pattern of grandiosity, 
need for admiration, and lack of empathy” by the American Psychiatric Association 
(APA) (2013). Extant research shows that narcissism in executives has potentially 
negative effects on firms, such as a higher degree of earnings management and inflated 
performance, weaker internal controls, higher probability of misstatements, resistance 
and opposition to their firm’s directors’ experiences when deciding on firm’s corporate 
strategy, and higher compensation due to their influence on the board (Frino, Lim, 
Mollica, and Palumbo 2015; Ham, Lang, Seybert, and Wang 2015; Hales, Hobson, and 
Resutek 2012; Zhu and Chen 2015; O’Reilly, Doerr, Caldwell, and Chatman 2014). In 
contrast, Olsen, Dworkis, and Young (2014) find that firms with narcissistic CEOs have 
higher EPS and share price than those with non-narcissistic CEOs, and they attribute this 
performance to real and operational activities rather than accruals. The literature has 
studied narcissism of CEOs in general. In this paper, however, I examine the specific 
contexts that may affect the relationship between narcissism of a CEO and firm 
performance.  
The literature in psychology suggests that under certain conditions, narcissism 
could be a desirable trait in leaders. For example, in their historical review of narcissistic 
leadership, Rosenthal and Pittinsky (2006) state that narcissists thrive in times that call 
for a new order to be established and that the confidence and dominance of a narcissistic 
individual can inspire “ideal-hungry” followers. Similarly, Maccoby (2000) states that 
narcissistic leaders may thrive in chaotic times but may seem out of place in more 
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tranquil times. Nevicka, De Hoogh, Van Vianen, and Ten Velden (2013) find that 
individuals choose narcissistic leaders, in spite of being aware of their negative traits, in 
the face of high uncertainty about the business environment. This occurs when a 
company is in difficulty, the company’s share price has plummeted, the company has lost 
market share, the company has an unpredictable work environment, and employees feel a 
sense of stress spreading through the organization. Further, the literature finds that the 
relationship between narcissism and performance quality is affected by the opportunity 
for self-enhancement, that is, whether the performance of the task is public or evaluated 
by others (Wallace and Baumeister 2002). 
Altogether, the literature suggests that narcissism may be favorable in some 
conditions and not in others. In particular, the literature suggests that it is likely to be 
most desirable in cases of high distress and high visibility of a firm. I expect a firm in 
financial distress to benefit from hiring a narcissistic CEO for several reasons. First, 
financial distress induces risk-taking in a firm (Kliger and Tsur 2011; Fiegenbaum 1009; 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas 1988) and individuals with narcissistic traits are more likely to 
take these risks (Maccoby 2000; Foster, Shenesey, and Goff 2009; Foster, Misra, and 
Reidy 2009; Lakey, Rose, Campbell, and Goodie 2008). Second, narcissistic individuals, 
by definition, have fantasies of unlimited success and are more likely to outperform non-
narcissistic individuals in situations in which the task is thought to be difficult (Wallace 
and Baumeister 2002). Third, individuals with narcissistic traits tend to move quickly 
(Aktas, de Bodt, Bollaert, and Roll 2016), and without the need or desire for oversight or 
approval (APA 2013; Zhu and Chen 2015), traits that would be desirable in a sinking 
firm, given the urgency in the firm’s financial state, and the need for speedy 
3 
 
implementation of recovery strategies. Evidence in Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013) 
suggests that boards of directors anticipate the causal effects of replacement CEOs and 
their individual characteristics. Thus, I expect and predict that boards foresee the effects 
of a CEO with narcissistic qualities on their particular firm and that boards of firms in 
financial distress are more likely to appoint a narcissistic CEO. 
I then examine the effect of narcissism of the CEO on firm performance under 
conditions of distress and firm visibility. Firms in distress would benefit from appointing 
a narcissistic CEO for the reasons described above. Additionally, literature suggests that 
narcissistic leaders thrive when they perceive an opportunity for self-enhancement 
(Wallace and Baumeister 2002), which would be provided by a highly visible firm. 
Therefore, in my second set of tests, I predict that the distressed firms who appoint a 
high-narcissism-scoring CEO will experience better, short-term future performance 
relative to the distressed firms that did not appoint a CEO with narcissistic traits and that 
the relationship between narcissism and firm performance is affected by firm visibility.1  
My analysis focuses on CEO successions in the Standard and Poor’s Execucomp 
database for the period 2007-2013. Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Canella’s (2009) “fit-
drift/shift-refit” theory argues that the environment under which a firm operates may 
change such that the current CEO does not fit the current needs of the firm. CEO turnover 
provides an opportunity for the board to re-align the needs of the firm with the skills of 
the CEO. Thus, I use CEO turnover as my sample setting to explore whether the board of 
directors matches individual CEO characteristics to the firm’s current economic situation. 
                                                          
1 I rely on the assumption that there are instances in which firms mismatch their appointed CEOs to the 
needs of the firm, that is, that a firm in financial distress does not hire a narcissist or that a firm not in 
financial distress hires a narcissist. This assumption is consistent with the turnover literature (Chen and 
Hambrick 2012; Finkelstein et al. 2009; Khurana 2002).  
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Over the sample time period, I identified 684 and 824 usable CEO turnover observations 
using only a photo measure or only a speech measure of narcissism, respectively, and 549 
observations using a combined score of these two measures. I find evidence that firms 
with decreasing debt-service ratios are more likely to appoint a CEO with a higher 
narcissism score. However, I do not find this same result using the Altman Z-Score 
measure of distress. The mixed results suggest a firm’s board of directors may be 
focusing on a firm’s immediate, short-term operational needs (captured by the debt-
service ratio), but not on longer-term indicators of financial health that are captured by 
the Altman Z-Score of a firm. The results could also be due to the recognized limitations 
of the Altman Z-Score, i.e., that it may not fully capture and/or correct for the increase in 
firm leverage and R&D of firms over time (Begley, Ming, Watts 1996; Franzen, Rodgers, 
and Simin 2007), which may  reduce its ability to predict bankruptcy, as discussed in 
more detail below.  
In my next set of tests, I explore whether the appointment of a CEO with 
narcissistic traits for firms under distress is followed by an increase in firm performance 
relative to firms not under distress that hire these types of CEOs or firms under distress 
that do not appoint this type of individual. I do not find evidence that firms with CEOs 
with high narcissism scores have increased future aggregate performance as levels of 
distress increase. In my third set of tests, I find that in low-visibility firms, narcissism on 
its own improves future performance. Further, narcissism increased future firm 
performance when interacted with firm distress. This result is inconsistent with my third 
hypothesis, which predicts that the performance should improve more for firms that are 
highly visible. I interpret this result to suggest that when a firm is highly visible, a 
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narcissistic individual may be too focused on his or her visibility, and thus, not focused 
on the effort in his work, while an individual with high narcissistic tendencies in a low-
visibility firm will not be distracted by the limelight and as such, will improve a 
distressed firm’s performance. Overall, the evidence in my tests supports the psychology 
literature that suggests narcissistic leaders thrive in times of uncertainty and with task 
difficulty. However, my findings are inconsistent with the psychology literature that 
suggests narcissists outperform non-narcissists when they sense an opportunity for self-
enhancement.  
My study adds to the accounting literature on upper-echelons theory, which 
explores the importance of individual CEO characteristics on firm outcomes (Hambrick 
2007). Understanding the relationship between narcissism and firm performance is 
important to accounting given that prior research has shown significant individual CEO 
effects on firm operational, disclosure, and reporting policies and strategies (Davis, Ge, 
Matsumoto, and Zhang 2015; Dejong and Ling 2013; Demerjian, Lev, and McVay 2012; 
Graham, Li, and Qui 2012; Baik, Farber, and Lee 2011; Ge, Matsumoto, and Zhang 
2011; Bertrand and Schoar 2003). My study contributes specifically to the accounting 
and finance literature that explores similar characteristics, such as overconfidence and 
hubris, on firm outcomes (Humphery-Jenner, Lisic, Nanda, and Silveri 2016; Hribar and 
Yang 2015; Hirshliefer, Low, and Teoh 2012; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2011; 
Malemendier and Tate 2008; Malmendier and Tate 2005). I add to this vein of research 
by looking at narcissism as a CEO characteristic, a more ingrained and fundamental 
individual trait. Narcissism and performance have been studied in general, but I examine 
moderating factors that play into this relationship, specifically, firm distress and firm 
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visibility. Understanding the conditional relationship of narcissism and performance 
under firm distress and firm visibility can lay the foundation for later examining the 
effects of this type of individual on the accounting decisions of a firm, such as on accrual 
choices, financial reporting and disclosure, and tax decisions, which themselves vary 
under different conditions of distress and visibility.  
This study is subject to several limitations. First, as with all studies that focus on 
voluntary behavior of firms, it is difficult to draw causal inferences from the results. In 
the first set of tests (the determinants tests), it is possible that a correlated and omitted 
variable is affecting both a firm’s state of financial distress and the firm’s decision to hire 
an individual with narcissistic traits as CEO. The tests examining the effect of narcissism 
on firm performance are also subject to concerns of endogeneity and self-selection. I 
attempt to address these concerns in a couple different ways. First, I use a lead-lag 
approach (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, Yang 2011; Christensen 2016) in my analysis and look at 
prior year distress and its effect on the current year CEO appointment, given that the 
contemporaneous relationship between CEO narcissism and firm distress could be 
ambiguous. Second, I examine the appointment decision and its effect on future 
performance and include year and industry fixed-effects in my models, to rule out the 
possibility that a correlated omitted variable persistent in a given year or in a given 
industry is driving the results. Even with these procedures, endogeneity and self-selection 
bias issues cannot be entirely ruled out. Despite these limitations, however, this study 
provides some interesting insights into the CEO selection process and how CEO 
narcissism may affect firm outcomes. 
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The primary premise of upper echelons theory is that individual characteristics of 
executives—shaped by their experiences, values, and personalities—influence the 
decisions they make for a firm (Hambrick 2007; Hambrick and Mason 1984). Consistent 
with this view, the literature has found significant manager fixed-effects on firm policies 
and firm outcomes. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that individual managers affect a 
firm’s investment policies (as measured by capital expenditures, investment to Tobin’s Q 
and cash flow sensitivity, and the number of acquisitions), financing policies (leverage, 
interest coverage, cash holdings, and dividends to earnings), and operational strategy and 
performance (R&D, advertising, SG&A, ROA, and operating ROA). More recently, Baik 
et al. (2011) measure CEO ability using press citations, manager-specific efficiency (with 
Demerjian et al.’s (2012) measure of revenue-generating efficiency), and industry-
adjusted ROA during the CEO’s tenure. They find that CEO-specific ability is positively 
related to the frequency and accuracy of earnings forecasts, and that the market is more 
responsive to high-ability CEOs’ forecasts. Graham et al. (2012) show that unobservable 
manager fixed-effects explain a majority of variation in executive compensation.  
In the accounting literature, individual characteristics of executives have been 
found to have a significant effect earnings quality, voluntary disclosure, tax avoidance, 
and firm performance. Ge et al. (2011) add CFO fixed-effects to a base model and find 
CFO-specific effects on accounting choices such as discretionary accruals, meeting or 
beating analysts’ expectations, earnings smoothing, and the likelihood of an accounting 
misstatement. Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and McVay (2013) find that the manager-specific 
8 
 
portion of firm efficiency (that is, the portion of a firm’s sales relative to certain inputs 
attributable to the individual manager) is associated with fewer restatements, higher 
earnings and accruals persistence, lower errors in the bad-debt provision, and higher 
accruals quality. In their study exploring individual executives and accruals, Dejong and 
Ling (2013) find that accruals are directly affected by an individual’s personal operating 
style. Davis et al. (2015) also find manager-specific effects associated with when they 
begin their careers, whether they are involved in charitable organizations, and their 
banking and consulting experience, on the optimistic tone of conference calls. Bamber, 
Jiang, and Wang (2010) find that managers’ disclosure styles (such as frequency, 
precision, and bias of disclosures) are influenced by demographic characteristics of these 
managers, such as professional background, age, military experience, or education. Firm 
tax avoidance, as measured by Cash and GAAP effective tax rates, is also found to be 
affected by individual executives (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2010), which Francis, 
Sun, and Wu (2013) attribute to managerial ability.  
More specifically related to this paper, the literature has explored the impact of 
executive hubris and overconfidence on firm outcomes. Using option- and press-based 
proxies for overconfidence, Hribar and Yang (2015) find that overconfidence of CEOs 
increases the likelihood of issuing earnings forecasts and also increases the optimism and 
precision of those forecasts. Using the same overconfidence measures, Humphery-Jenner 
et al. (2016) find that overconfident CEOs receive more incentive-based compensation to 
exploit their positively biased views of the firm. Hirshliefer et al. (2012) find that firms 
with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain 
more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given levels 
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of R&D, but that these results occur only in innovative industries. From a stakeholder 
perspective, Tang et al. (2015) find that CEOs who are perceived by the media as 
overconfident, or “hubristic,” engage in less socially responsible firm activities and more 
socially irresponsible firm activities (as measured by KLD data categories). The authors 
attribute this finding to the CEOs’ underestimation of firm dependence on stakeholders 
for resources and support due to their overestimation of their own capabilities and self-
sufficiency. Other studies have found that executive overconfidence is related to 
financing decisions of the firm (these firms issue less equity), overpayment for target 
companies and pursuit of value-destroying M&As, and to over-investing when internal 
funds are readily available (Malmendier et al. 2011; Malmendier and Tate 2008; 
Malmendier and Tate 2005).  
In this paper, I examine a related, but fundamentally different managerial trait—
narcissism. Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD) describes an enduring, pervasive, 
and inflexible pattern of behavior that deviates from cultural norms. Specifically, to meet 
the clinical definition of NPD according to the American Psychiatric Association (APA), 
an individual must exhibit a consistent “pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), 
need for admiration, and lack of empathy” (APA 2013). Individuals popularly considered 
to be narcissists are not necessarily clinically diagnosed as having NPD. However, these 
individuals often exhibit personality traits that are consistent with the clinical definition 
of NPD. As is common in the literature, I thus focus on the idea of sub-clinical 
narcissism, that is, on individuals who exhibit NPD traits.  
As discussed above, the previous literature has examined overconfidence and 
hubris (defined as exaggerated or extreme overconfidence), characteristics of executives 
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that are often conceptually associated with the trait of narcissism. Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997) note that extreme confidence or hubris can be a result of external 
stimuli, such as recent performance, but as Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) summarize, 
“narcissism is the more fundamental, ingrained property,” not reliant on past 
performance. Further, the APA (2013) describes one of the elements of narcissism to be 
an expectation of being recognized as superior without the commensurate achievements. 
Narcissists place a high importance on how they are perceived by others, and want to 
manage and enhance this perception. Raskin, Novacek, and Hogan (1991) describe 
narcissism having a defensive competitive element, such that a narcissist has a high need 
for external approval. At the same time, narcissists lack empathy and do not recognize or 
identify with the feelings and needs of others (APA 2013). Thus, high self-esteem, 
overconfidence, and hubris differ from narcissism in that they lack these additional 
elements. These differences are important for this study because they create different 
implications for firm performance, particularly under the conditions of firm distress and 
firm visibility, as discussed in more detail below.  
In the popular press and in every-day discourse, narcissism is used in a primarily 
negative sense. Several academic studies have found negative effects of narcissism in 
leaders. Hornett and Fredricks’ (2005) case study analyzes individual perceptions of 
several corporate executives who were in the news for ethical transgressions or criminal 
actions during that time. They report that several of these “fallen leaders” have a 
narcissistic quality that led these individuals to work for themselves, rather than work 
toward achieving corporate goals. Ongoing studies show that narcissism is associated 
with earnings manipulation, as measured by abnormal discretionary accruals, abnormal 
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discretionary expenses, abnormal cash flows from operations, and abnormal production 
costs incurred (Frino et al. 2015; Ham et al. 2015); inflated performance, as measured by 
GMAT scores in an experimental setting (Hales et al. 2012); less timely loss recognition, 
as measured by conditional accounting conservatism (differential timeliness of good 
versus bad news); weaker internal controls, as measured by ineffective internal controls 
and number of internal control weaknesses; and a higher probability of accounting 
restatements (Ham et al. 2015). Zhu and Chen (2015) find that narcissistic CEOs 
(measured by a 4-trait index) resist the influence of other directors’ prior experience and 
tend to adopt corporate strategies that are opposite of what fellow directors’ prior 
experience would suggest. From a market perspective, Aktas et al. (2016) look at CEOs 
of M&A firms and find that acquirer shareholders react less favorably to a takeover 
announcement if the target firm CEO is more narcissistic. Further, they find that 
narcissism of CEOs leads to lower probability of deal completion. Finally, O’Reilly et al. 
(2014) posit and find that narcissistic CEOs extract higher levels of compensation and 
have larger spreads between their own compensation and the compensation of other 
executives.  
On the other hand, many traits exhibited by narcissists overlap with those of good, 
strong leaders, such as high self-confidence, strategic vision for the future, and charisma. 
Thus, a firm under the leadership of a narcissist may experience positive outcomes. Some 
of the literature is consistent with this notion. In the context of M&As, Aktas et al. (2016) 
find that narcissistic CEOs initiate acquisitions and negotiate faster. In the same context, 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) find that narcissism in CEOs is positively related to the 
number and size of acquisitions and firm performance (shareholder returns and ROA). 
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Olsen et al. (2014) find that firms with narcissistic CEOs have higher earnings per share 
(EPS) and a higher share price than firms with non-narcissistic CEOs.   
Considering that some traits of narcissists and strong leaders overlap, and 
considering the evidence on the outcome effects of narcissists, it is not clear whether the 
appointment of a narcissistic CEO is necessarily a bad choice for the firm. In their review 
of the literature on narcissism in organizational contexts, Campbell, Hoffman, Campbell, 
and Marchisio (2011) stress that much of the research attempts to answer the question of 
whether narcissism is good or bad, but they suggest that researchers should instead 
explore the conditions under which narcissistic leaders thrive and the various outcomes of 
their leadership in those particular conditions. In their review paper, Rosenthal and 
Pittinsky (2006) pose the question of whether findings in the narcissism literature point to 
optimal conditions of the success of narcissistic leaders. They state they would expect 
narcissists to thrive in times that call for a new order to be established. Similarly, 
Maccoby (2000) states that narcissistic leaders may thrive in chaotic times and may seem 
out of place in more tranquil times. In their experimental study, Nevicka et al. (2013) find 
that even in instances when individuals are aware of the negative features of narcissistic 
leaders, they choose them as leaders anyway if times are uncertain, that is, if the 
company’s environment is one in which the company is in difficulty, the share price has 
plummeted, the company has lost market share, has an unpredictable work environment, 
and employees feel a sense of stress spreading through the organization.  
Based on evidence in the prior literature, a firm under financial distress may 
benefit from appointing a narcissistic leader. First, prospect theory suggests that 
individuals are not uniformly risk averse. In the negative domain—that is, in times of 
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losses and uncertainty—individuals are risk-seeking (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The 
management and finance literatures have translated this idea into corporate contexts, and 
have found empirical evidence that financial distress induces risk-taking. Several studies 
find that firms with below-average or below-median returns take on more risk than firms 
with high returns (Kliger and Tsur 2011; Fiegenbaum 1990; Fiegenbaum and Thomas 
1988). The general notion is that risk-taking is appealing to individuals who have varying 
risk preferences in firms under financial distress because they have little else to lose. 
Thus, firms in distress benefit from the risk-taking. Adding to the above, the empirical 
literature supports a positive link between narcissism and risk-taking.2  As Maccoby 
(2000) states, “Productive narcissists [are] risk takers willing to get the job done…” 
Additionally, Bandiera, Guiso, Prat, and Sadun (2015) show that firms select managers 
based on those managers’ risk preferences.  
Second, one of the defining characteristics of a narcissist is a “grandiose sense of 
self-importance (e.g., exaggerates achievements and talents…” and a preoccupation “with 
fantasies of unlimited success…” (APA 2013). Thus, a narcissistic individual would not 
be one to shy away from a leadership role in a failing firm out of fear that he or she is not 
qualified to fix the firm’s problems—a narcissist may even be drawn to these particular 
firms. Supporting this idea, and experiment by Wallace and Baumeister (2002) finds that 
individuals with high narcissism scores perform best when task success is thought to be 
difficult to achieve, but perform relatively poorly when task success is thought to be 
unchallenging. Thus, a narcissistic individual could be drawn to the leadership role in a 
distressed firm. Furthermore, he or she may actually perform better in this firm than in a 
                                                          
2 See Foster, Shenesey, and Goff (2009); Foster, Misra, and Reidy (2009); Lakey, Rose, Campbell, and 
Goodie (2008); and Britt and Garrity (2006). 
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non-distressed firm where the task is not challenging. Therefore a distressed firm could 
benefit from this type of individual.  
Third, a firm in distress would likely benefit from a fast-acting individual given 
the urgency of its financial state. The study by Aktas et al. (2016) makes a link between 
narcissism and the ability to act quickly by showing that higher levels of CEO narcissism 
are associated with a shorter takeover process length in M&A activity. Furthermore, a 
narcissist, by definition, lacks empathy and is unwilling to recognize the feelings and 
needs of others (APA 2013). Thus, a narcissistic CEO coming into his or her role in a 
financially distressed firm would not feel the need to cooperate with members of the 
board or other executives to begin to implement the changes he or she believes are 
necessary for the firm. An individual who is able to empathize may find it necessary to 
take a more deliberative approach to his or her decision-making by meeting with other 
governing individuals within a firm and achieving a consensus. Thus, an empathetic 
manager may not move quickly enough for a failing firm. Consistent with this argument, 
Zhu and Chen (2015) find that relatively narcissistic CEOs strongly resist the influence of 
other directors and may even adopt corporate strategies that are the opposite of what the 
prior experience of other directors would suggest for the firm. Additionally, a narcissistic 
CEO may be allowed to act quickly without oversight, given his or her charismatic 
nature. Maccoby (2000) describes narcissistic leaders as having “personal magnetism and 
[the] ability to stir enthusiasm among audiences.” Campbell and Campbell (2009) 
describe the benefits of narcissistic leadership as occurring in the “emerging zone” of 
leadership, that is, in the stages during which a person is becoming a leader, involving 
unacquainted individuals, early-stage relationships, and short-term contexts. The authors 
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use prior literature’s link between narcissism and charisma (Deluga 1997) as supportive 
of their own findings with respect to this emerging leadership setting. 
Based on the above, I predict that the board of directors matches a troubled firm’s 
needs to the particular skills of a CEO having traits consistent with narcissism. I 
formalize this prediction with the following hypothesis: 
H1:  The likelihood that a firm will hire a high-narcissism-scoring CEO is 
positively associated with firm’s financial distress in the prior year. 
As a natural extension to H1, I expect that firms under distress that appoint this 
type of individual will experience the benefits of the choice, as the literature suggests. 
This leads to my next hypothesis:  
H2:  Appointment of a high-narcissism-scoring CEO by financially distressed 
firms is associated with a subsequent improvement in firm performance.  
The narcissism literature has attributed the mixed results regarding performance 
of narcissistic leaders to other potentially missing moderating variables. Wallace and 
Baumeister (2002) argue that the missing element is the “opportunity for glory” or a self-
enhancement opportunity. In their four-part experiment, they posit and find that the 
relationship between narcissism and performance quality is moderated by the opportunity 
for self-enhancement and that narcissists actually seem to perform below their abilities 
when the goal is not self-enhancing. They describe a task as more self-enhancing when 
the performance of the task is visible to the public or when performance is evaluated by 
others, provided that the narcissist values the opinions of those he or she perceives to be 
observing his or her performance. In the corporate realm, a firm with high visibility 
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would offer this opportunity for self-enhancement to a CEO. Thus, my final hypothesis is 
as follows: 
H3: Firm performance under a high-narcissism-scoring CEO is positively 
associated with firm visibility. 
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CHAPTER III  
RESEARCH SETTING AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
Fee et al. (2013) argue that because of the endogeneity of any change in top 
management, the fixed-effects approach in many previous studies makes it difficult to 
determine whether idiosyncrasies of individual managers play a causal role in a firm’s 
selections. In fact, in a sample of exogenous CEO transitions (death, declining health, or 
natural retirement), they find no evidence of changes in firm policies or performance. 
They suggest that random and unobservable managerial traits do not explain variation in 
policy, but rather that the board anticipates the needs of the firm at the time of turnover 
and selects specific managers to fit those needs. These findings are consistent with 
Finkelstein et al.’s (2009) “fit-drift/shift-refit” theory, which posits that as the conditions 
of the firm change over time, the current executive’s skills becomes less suited to the 
firm. When a board has the opportunity to select a new executive, it can re-align the 
current needs of a firm with the skills of the new executive. Supporting this theory, Chen 
and Hambrick (2012) find that while CEO replacement, in and of itself, has no real effect 
on firm performance, troubled firms perform better when the newly appointed CEOs are 
well-matched to the current conditions of the firm. Thus, the particular setting of CEO 
succession provides an opportunity for researchers to examine the conditions of the firm 
and how the board matches the needs of the firm to the skills of the individual appointed 
as a new CEO. 
I begin my sample selection with all CEO turnovers from the Execucomp 
database of S&P 1500 firms. First, given data collection costs, I restrict my sample to the 
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years 2007-2013.3  Further, a majority of corporations keep annual reports (a necessary 
element for one of the narcissism measures discussed below) on their websites only for 
the most recent ten years. The sample period ends in 2013 to allow for assessment of the 
firm’s subsequent performance. The sample window is large enough to include periods of 
both economic expansion and economic recession, allowing my tests to span potentially 
different distress environments for firms. For a turnover observation to be valid, I require 
that both the outgoing and incoming CEO are present for at least two consecutive years. I 
also require that the incoming CEO takes on his or her role as CEO immediately after the 
outgoing CEO’s departure. These requirements remove any temporary assignments of 
CEOs and allow me to study the effects of the CEO chosen by the board. I obtain 
financial data from the Compustat database and data on media mentions and transcripts 
of earnings conference calls from the Factiva database.  
The primary proxy used to measure narcissism in the psychology literature is the 
Narcissism Personality Inventory (NPI), which is a standard survey consisting of 
questions regarding behaviors, traits, and other personality characteristics that an 
individual answers for him- or herself, to reveal whether the individual can be deemed 
narcissistic (Emmons 1984). Given the difficult and sensitive nature of collecting this 
type of survey from individuals, researchers have developed other, more unobtrusive 
methods by which to collect narcissism measures (mainly, non-participant observation). 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) develop and validate an index of narcissism using 
                                                          
3 Data collection for the photo score measure includes obtaining individual annual reports for each firm 
from a firm’s website or a third-party website, searching for the shareholder letter and observing the CEO’s 
photo in the shareholder letter to assign a score. Data collection for the speech measure includes 
downloading earnings conference call transcripts for the relevant period for each observation from the 
Factiva database.  
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unobtrusive and observable indicators and then map these indicators into the four 
conceptual elements of the NPI. The literature has since used variations of their index 
(Aktas et al. 2016; Olsen et al. 2014; Zhu and Chen 2015; and Chatterjee and Hambrick 
2011). In this paper, I follow the prior literature and use the prominence of the CEO’s 
photograph in the annual report and the ratio of singular personal pronouns to all personal 
pronouns used by the CEO in the Q&A section of the firm’s conference call as my two 
primary measures of narcissism. I then combine the two measures, described in detail 
below, to form a single empirical index of the degree of CEO narcissism.  
The first measure of narcissism I use is the prominence of the CEO’s photograph 
in the firm’s annual report. Anecdotal evidence lends support to the idea that both the 
photograph and the shareholder letter in the annual report are greatly under the control of 
the CEO (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007) and can be used as a way for this individual to 
showcase himself or herself, catering to the CEO’s vanity, self-absorption, and sense of 
entitlement. For each valid CEO turnover observation, I review the annual reports found 
on each company’s website to identify the CEO’s photograph.4 I follow Olsen et al. 
(2014) to assign a “CEO photograph prominence” score to each annual report 
appearance. The categorizations are as follows: 
(1) No photograph of the CEO is provided5  
(2) The CEO is photographed with other executives or board members 
                                                          
4 A CEOs picture is generally located in the “Letter to Shareholders” portion of the annual report. In several 
instances, the shareholder letter is not located in the annual report, and is instead either located as a stand-
alone document or as part of a separate report called an “Annual Review.” I reviewed a company’s website 
for whichever document held the annual letter to shareholders from the CEO. 
5 Some firms do not provide an annual report through their website, and as such, only the SEC-required 10-
K is available. The 10-K follows a specific format, does not contain stylistic elements, and does not 
typically contain a Letter to Shareholders. Rather than categorize these cases as having no photograph of 
the CEO (1), I remove these observations altogether.  
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(3) The CEO is photographed alone, and the photograph takes up less than 
half of the page 
(4) The CEO is photographed alone, and the photograph takes up at least half 
of the page, with text taking up some space on the page 
(5) The CEO is photographed alone, and the photograph takes up the entire 
page 
I collect the photo prominence score for 3 years: the first year a new CEO appears in the 
annual report as CEO (year t), and the two years after (years t+1 and t+2). It could be the 
case that in the first year a new CEO appears in the company’s annual report, the 
company is intentionally prominently displaying the CEO’s photo with a public relations 
motive, and thus, in the first appearance, the photo may not necessarily reflect the CEO’s 
preference for how he or she is pictured. Therefore, I do not use the first appearance of a 
CEO (year t), and instead take an average of the scores for the second and third photos 
(pic_avg). I also construct one photo score for the outgoing CEO from the year preceding 
the CEO turnover, for use in building “change” variables. 
The second measure of narcissism is the CEO’s use of first-person, singular 
pronouns. This measure captures a narcissistic individual’s sense of superiority and 
exploitativeness by capturing how he or she takes credit for what might not be solely a 
personal achievement. The literature has found that individual manager characteristics 
affect conference call tone (Davis et al. 2015), that a manager’s vocal cues are 
informative to analysts on conference calls (Mayew and Venkatachalam 2012), and that 
individual executives exhibit linguistic features that are predictive of financial 
restatements and accounting problems during conference calls. Thus, the conference calls 
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reflect individual traits of the executives who are speaking. Therefore, for this measure, I 
first collected two analyst conference call transcripts per turnover firm from the Factiva 
database (using the CQ FD Disclosure source): one from the year before the CEO 
turnover (where the outgoing CEO spoke) and one from a year after the CEO turnover 
(where the new CEO spoke). I then isolated the Q&A section of the conference call, and 
further isolated the portions of the Q&A section that represented only the CEO’s words.6  
I counted the number of first-person singular pronouns (I, me, my, mine, I’m, I’ve, I’ll, 
and I’d) and divided that number by the sum of those pronouns plus first-person plural 
pronouns (we, us, our, ours, we’re, we’ve, we’ll, and we’d). The final measure, therefore, 
is a ratio of singular first-person pronouns to all first-person pronouns (pnoun_ratio). I 
use the incoming CEO’s score minus the outgoing CEO’s score for change variables.  
 I then combine the above two underlying constructs, picture score and speech 
score, to from a single measure of narcissism. Although using the combined measure 
reduces my sample and thus, reduces the power of my tests, I use the combined measure 
as my primary measure of narcissism for two main reasons. First, the combined measure 
captures more of the conceptual elements of narcissism than either one of the individual 
measures would alone. In particular, Emmons (1984) uses the questions in the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (which is used in psychology research as the primary 
measure of narcissism) to develop four conceptual factors of narcissism captured by those 
                                                          
6 Conference calls typically contain a Management Discussion (MD) portion and a Q&A portion. The MD 
portion is generally prepared in advance, or “scripted,” whereas the Q&A is the interactive portion of the 
call, in which analysts and investors can ask questions of management, and is not always explicitly 
prepared in advance. While there is evidence that even the Q&A portion of conference calls may be 
scripted (Lee 2016), anything scripted would likely be related to content matter, and thus, the manner in 
which the content is communicated would still be influenced by a narcissist and reflect a narcissist’s 
tendencies of speech. Thus, either section of the call could be a valid section of speech to construct my 
measures. However, due to its more spontaneous nature and thus, potential ability to capture personality 
traits, I choose to use the Q&A section. 
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questions. He labels these conceptual factors as: 1. Leadership/Authority, 2. Self-
absorption/Self-admiration, 3. Superiority/Arrogance, and 4. 
Exploitativeness/Entitlement. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) then develop an index of 
narcissism that uses unobtrusive and observable indicators to capture these four 
conceptual elements. No single indicator captures all four conceptual elements. The 
prominence of a CEO’s photo captures the leadership/authority, self-absorption/self-
admiration, and exploitativeness/entitlement elements, but not the superiority/arrogance 
element. The use of first-person, singular pronouns measure captures the 
leadership/authority, superiority/arrogance, and exploitativeness/entitlement elements, 
but not the self-absorption/self-admiration element. In fact, by looking ahead to Table 4, 
one sees that the individual measures are not significantly correlated. Together, however, 
the picture score and speech score may successfully capture all four conceptual elements 
of narcissism. 
 Second, the individual measures of narcissism may be noisy, or may be capturing 
something else about the firm. For example, as mentioned previously, the photo in the 
annual report may reflect the firm’s desire to showcase the CEO, without necessarily 
reflecting his or her desire to showcase him- or herself. The photo may also be capturing 
the style of a particular firm’s public relations department or the firm could simply be 
following the previous year’s template. The speech score is more specific than the photo 
score, given that it measures the actual individual’s way of speaking. However, there 
could still be measurement error, depending on the events that are being discussed in a 
conference call. For example, in a particular conference call, if the focus of an analyst’s 
question is on the CEO herself for whatever reason, rather than on a firm event, then that 
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CEO’s singular personal pronoun usage will be higher than it might be if she were 
discussing general financial results of the firm. A combined measure of narcissism would 
capture the overlap of these two measures and reduce some of the measurement error 
found in each individual measure use alone. 
To create the combined measure, I first standardize the picture and speech scores 
described above. I then use the sum of the standardized scores to create a combined 
variable (nar_sum). I also create a binary measure for this combined score (nar_bin) 
which takes a value of one if the standardized picture and speech scores are both greater 
than 0, and zero otherwise. For my main tests, I use the combined measure of narcissism 
and discuss these tests and results more thoroughly. Additional analyses in Section V 
show results for the same tests using the individual parts of the combined measure.  
A common element in prior studies’ measure of narcissism is relative pay, 
typically measured as a CEO’s cash and non-cash compensation relative to the next 
highest paid executive’s cash and non-cash pay, respectively. It is true that a CEO may 
have influence over his own compensation and the compensation of the other top 
executives, as the results in O’Reilly et al. (2014) suggest. However, this measure relies 
on the assumption that the contracting environment is inefficient over time. The 
complexity of the environment for compensation contracting, as well as the confounding 
effects of the CEOs actual expertise, reduce the ability of the measure to capture 
narcissism of the CEO. Further, the results in O’Reilly et al. (2014) suggest that CEO 
tenure has a significant impact on the gap between a narcissistic CEO’s pay and the pay 
of the other executives. Thus, in my turnover setting, compensation of the newly hired 
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executive may not reflect the effects of longer-term pay extraction. For these reasons, I 
choose not to use this measure in my construct of narcissism. 
Table 1, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the combined narcissism 
measure (nar_sum), the picture score (pic_avg), and the speech measure (pnoun_ratio), 
as well as their binary, high-versus-low counterparts for the incoming CEOs. The 
combined binary score (nar_bin) is measured as discussed above, with approximately 1/3 
of the sample having a score of 1 (high narcissism scores). The variable pic_bin takes a 
value of one if the picture score is greater than or equal to 3, and zero otherwise; 
speech_bin takes a value of one if the ratio is higher than the mean, and zero otherwise. 
Prior studies that have used comparable measures for narcissism show similar values for 
the mean picture score and mean speech score. For example, Aktas et al. (2016) use the 
same measure (pnoun_ratio) and report a mean of .215 for their sample of 146 CEOs. 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) show a mean of .210 for this same measure on their 
sample of 111 CEOs. Both of these are slightly lower than my sample’s mean of .239. 
For the picture score average, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) show a mean of 2.52 
(n=111), Judd et al. (2015) show a mean score of 2.57 (n=972), and Olsen et al. (2014) 
show a mean of 2.79 (n=283), which are all slightly higher than the mean of my picture 
score (pic_avg) of 2.37. Only one of these studies, Olsen et al. (2014), uses a binary 
measure of narcissism, and bases this indicator on a composite score of narcissism. They 
report a binary mean of .51, compared to the binary measure used in this paper (nar_bin) 
of .29. This difference is not surprising, however, given that their binary measure takes a 
value of 1 if the composite score is higher than the average, while my binary measure  
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Table 1 
Incoming CEO Narcissism Summary 
       
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Narcissism Measures 
 N mean min med max  
nar_sum (combined score) 549 0.043 -3.699 0.046 
7.96
3  
nar_bin (combined binary) 549 0.295 0 0 1  
pic_avg (picture score) 684 2.371 1 3 5  
pic_bin (picture binary) 684 0.537 0 1 1  
pnoun_ratio (speech score) 824 0.239 0 0.233 1  
speech_bin (speech binary) 824 0.473 0 0 1  
       
Panel B: Photo Score and Speech Score Breakdown for Incoming CEOs 
pic_avg Freq. 
Percen
t Cum. 
pnoun_ 
ratio   
1 143 26.05 26.05 0.236   
1.5 9 1.64 27.69 0.235   
2 64 11.66 39.34 0.241   
2.5 31 5.65 44.99 0.206   
3 250 45.54 90.53 0.248   
3.5 27 4.92 95.45 0.211   
4 14 2.55 98.00 0.257   
4.5 1 0.18 98.18 0.281   
5 10 1.82 
100.0
0 0.264     
Total 549 100.00     
       
Panel C: Hiring Changes from Prior CEO to Incoming CEO 
 Combined Score Picture Score Speech Score 
 Freq. 
Percen
t Freq. Percent Freq. 
Percen
t 
1 to 0 (high narcissism to low) 81 14.75 102 14.91 185 22.45 
0 (no change) 367 66.85 482 70.47 456 55.34 
0 to 1 (low narcissism to high) 101 18.40 100 14.62 183 22.21 
  549 100.00 684 100.00 824 100.00 
This table presents summary information for the narcissism measures. For a turnover observation to be 
valid, I require the outgoing and incoming CEOs to be present for at least two years. Further, I require 
the incoming CEO to immediately replace the outgoing CEO. The scores in Panel A and B are for the 
incoming CEO (but require the availability of data for the outgoing CEO). All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
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takes a value of 1 if both the standardized picture score and standardized speech score are 
higher than their respective means.  
Panel B of Table 1 breaks down the frequency of the photo scores for the 549 
observations that have both a photo and speech score, and shows the average speech 
score (pnoun_ratio) for each group of photo score observations. Panel C shows the 
turnover observations by whether the outgoing or incoming CEO is classified as a 
narcissist with the binary measures. Table 2 breaks down the sample into the Fama-
French industries, showing a wide representation of industries, with the Finance and 
Business Equipment industries having the most turnovers.  
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics and tests the differences between the variable 
means and medians between the groups of firms that appointed a CEO with a high 
Industry Description N mean N mean N mean
1 Consumer NonDurables 31 0.045 37 2.432 46 0.216
2 Consumer Durables 14 0.895 19 2.632 24 0.264
3 Manufacturing 80 0.005 95 2.426 96 0.227
4 Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 31 0.177 37 2.500 37 0.246
5 Chemicals and Allied Products 18 0.412 23 2.826 21 0.216
6 Business Equipment 82 0.001 89 2.253 145 0.251
7 Telephone and Television Transmission 6 -1.699 10 1.950 12 0.174
8 Utilities 29 0.052 47 2.830 36 0.203
9 Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 62 -0.689 79 1.943 100 0.221
10 Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 30 0.080 36 2.375 66 0.239
11 Finance 107 0.254 141 2.390 143 0.256
12
Other -- Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, 
Hotel, Bus Serv, Entertainment 59 0.310 71 2.324 98 0.254
549 0.043 684 2.371 824 0.239
This table presents the sample frequency by Fama-French industries for each measure of narcissism. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Table 2 
Sample Industry Breakout
Observations with a Narcissism Score
nar_sum pic_avg pnoun_ratio
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narcissism score and the firms that did not. Panel A shows the groups split by the 
combined-score binary measure, Panel B splits them by the picture binary measure, and 
Panel C groups them using the speech binary measure. In all panels, the firm’s distress 
variables (z-score and debt-service ratio) do not differ significantly between the two 
groups, which could be due to the variables being measured at year t, the year of CEO 
appointment, and not at year t-1 or t-2, when it would be expected for distress of the 
firms to significantly differ between the two groups. All panels show significant 
differences in mean or median or both for visibility, as measured by media mentions, 
suggesting either that high-scoring CEOs may find themselves in more visible firms or 
that the media is drawn to such CEOs. Further, the significant differences in market 
value, EPS, income, operating income, and ROA in Panels A and B between the groups 
seem to point to a relationship consistent with narcissism of a CEO being positive for 
firm performance, consistent with Olsen et al. (2014). Panel C show less-pronounced 
differences in several of the variables, but still shows significant differences in market 
value and market-to-book means, leverage medians, and capital expenditure means and 
medians.   
Table 4 shows the Pearson correlation between all variables. This table shows us 
that the two narcissism measures are not significantly correlated. As discussed in more 
detail above, this is likely because they capture different conceptual elements of 
narcissism. There is not a significant correlation between the narcissism measures and the 
z-score or debt-service ratio, which is not surprising given that my hypotheses do not 
predict a direct relationship between narcissism and distress, but rather predict that their  
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics 
        
Panel A: Comparison Using Combined Measure of Narcissism 
        
 
nar_  
bin = 1 
nar_  
bin = 0   
nar_  
bin = 1 
nar_  
bin = 0  
 mean mean   median median   
zscore -3.276 -3.680   -3.224 -3.130  
debt_serv -28.793 -82.146   -3.994 -3.863  
media_pre 342.559 265.506   136.000 107.000 ** 
at 36052.044 20119.695   3979.291 3074.743 *** 
mkvalt 11819.948 7444.666 **  3515.385 2120.586 *** 
epspi 1.877 1.520   1.750 1.510  
ib 712.715 373.752 ***  166.190 92.004 *** 
ebitda 1755.834 1194.931 *  515.491 316.717 *** 
ROA 0.127 0.129   0.130 0.120  
mtb 2.153 3.007 **  1.808 1.849  
levg 0.233 0.240   0.187 0.220  
rd_ratio 0.022 0.020   0.000 0.000  
capex_ratio 0.039 0.046   0.025 0.030  
        
Panel B: Comparison Using Picture Measure of Narcissism 
        
 
pic_  
bin = 1 
pic_  
bin = 0   
pic_  
bin = 1 
pic_  
bin = 0  
 mean mean   median median   
zscore -3.659 -3.601   -3.190 -2.990  
debt_serv -54.737 -65.577   -3.605 -3.539  
media_pre 385.514 254.129 ***  129.500 100.000 *** 
at 40272.534 15859.726 **  4118.969 2712.817 *** 
mkvalt 15188.704 6067.531 ***  3190.400 1805.397 *** 
epspi 1.900 1.416 **  1.795 1.400 ** 
ib 830.562 287.147 ***  164.919 78.720 *** 
ebitda 2435.430 963.387 ***  493.300 253.408 *** 
ROA 0.135 0.116 **  0.130 0.112 ** 
mtb 2.435 2.630   1.787 1.742  
levg 0.234 0.240   0.208 0.203  
rd_ratio 0.018 0.022   0.000 0.000  
capex_ratio 0.047 0.040 *  0.034 0.024 ** 
  
29 
 
        
Panel C: Comparison Using Speech Measure of Narcissism 
        
 
speech_ bin 
= 1 
speech_ bin 
= 0   
speech_ bin 
= 1 
speech_ bin 
= 0  
 mean mean   median median   
zscore -3.248 -3.642   -3.107 -3.015  
debt_serv -42.882 -79.588   -3.646 -3.913  
media_pre 327.445 239.664 *  117.000 101.500 * 
at 26899.738 17009.707   2952.000 2606.943  
mkvalt 9968.797 6307.588 *  2175.096 1872.144  
epspi 1.135 1.275   1.140 1.380  
ib 430.172 263.303   87.097 75.304  
ebitda 1307.736 1064.350   327.638 269.398  
ROA 0.117 0.125   0.116 0.117  
mtb 2.372 3.041 **  1.805 1.789  
levg 0.235 0.247   0.177 0.228 ** 
rd_ratio 0.026 0.026   0.000 0.000  
capex_ratio 0.040 0.046 *  0.024 0.029 * 
This table provides summary statistics for variables of interest, grouped by the narcissism 
measure binary, which takes a value of one if the standardized binary picture and speech 
scores equal 1, and zero otherwise (Panel A); takes a value of one if the appointed CEO's 
photo score is greater than or equal to 3, and zero otherwise (Panel B); or takes a value of one 
if the appointed CEO's pronoun ratio score is greater than the median, and zero otherwise 
(Panel C). P-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values for the differences in medians are calculated 
using the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
interaction affects firm performance. Table 4 also shows the combined measure and 
photo measure of narcissism significantly positively correlated to media mentions, 
consistent with high scoring narcissistic CEOs being drawn to highly visible firms, or 
drawing the media to their firms. The narcissism measure is also positively correlated 
with market value, EPS, net income, and operating income, consistent with Table 3 and 
with prior literature. The table also shows that while the z-score and debt-service ratio 
measures are positively and significantly correlated, the coefficient is only .17. This 
suggests that while both measures capture firm distress, they may be capturing different 
elements of firm distress. 
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nar_ 
sum
pic_ 
avg
pnoun_ 
ratio zscore
debt_ 
serv
media_
pre at
nar_sum 1.00
pic_avg 0.71 * 1.00
pnoun_ratio 0.73 * 0.04 1.00
zscore 0.02 0.01 0.02 1.00
debt_serv 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.17 * 1.00
media_pre 0.08 * 0.12 * 0.04 -0.01 0.04 1.00
at 0.04 0.07 * 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.51 * 1.00
mkvalt 0.11 * 0.17 * 0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.82 * 0.39 *
epspi 0.12 * 0.17 * 0.00 -0.18 * -0.02 0.33 * 0.09 *
ib 0.12 * 0.15 * 0.03 -0.06 * 0.02 0.53 * 0.05
ebitda 0.08 * 0.16 * 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.78 * 0.52 *
ROA 0.03 0.08 * -0.04 -0.47 * -0.17 * 0.04 -0.10 *
mtb -0.10 * -0.03 -0.03 -0.18 * -0.03 0.02 -0.02
levg -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 * 0.36 * 0.15 * 0.02 0.03
rd_ratio -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.15 * -0.05 0.01 -0.06 *
capex_ratio -0.07 * 0.02 -0.09 * 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.09 *
mkvalt epspi ib ebit ROA mtb
capex_
ratio
mkvalt 1.00
epspi 0.41 * 1.00
ib 0.90 * 0.50 * 1.00
ebitda 0.86 * 0.39 * 0.71 * 1.00
ROA 0.12 * 0.32 * 0.14 * 0.08 * 1.00
mtb 0.03 0.10 * 0.03 0.00 0.28 * 1.00
levg -0.01 -0.12 * -0.08 * 0.03 0.02 -0.06 *
rd_ratio -0.01 -0.08 * -0.02 -0.04 -0.17 * -0.01
capex_ratio 0.01 0.07 * 0.03 0.01 0.26 * 0.00 1.00
Table 4 
Variable Correlations
This table provides the Pearson correlations among variables of interest. * next to the correlation 
coefficient indicates that the correlation is statistically significant at least at the 10% level. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A.
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CHAPTER IV  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Predicting the Appointment of a CEO with Narcissistic Traits 
I use the following Probit model to explore whether firms in distress are more 
likely to appoint a CEO with narcissistic qualities:  
Prob(HireNarCEO) = β0 + β1Distress + β2Performance + β3MTB + β4RDExp  
     + β5CapitalExpenditures + ∑βIndustryD + ε        (1) 
In equation (1), the dependent variable, HireNarCEO, is measured with the 
combined narcissism binary score as described above. I use two different measures for 
my variable of interest, Distress: Altman Z-Score (zscore) (Altman 1968) and the firm’s 
debt-service ratio (debt_serv). The Altman Z-Score is widely used in the finance and 
accounting literature as a predictor of firm bankruptcy and a proxy for financial distress 
(e.g., Dichev 1998; Holder-Webb and Wilkins 2000; Piotroski 2000; and Eisdorfer 2008). 
The measure uses several ratios of accounting and stock market information to assign a z-
score to each firm, where a lower z-score indicates higher financial distress.7 The z-score 
of a firm focuses on long-term viability of a firm. The measure is not without its 
limitations, however. Begley, Ming, and Watts (1996) note that since the measure was 
developed, there has been increasing acceptance of high levels of corporate debt, such 
that a small reduction in debt has a smaller effect on the likelihood of bankruptcy than it 
did in the past. They continue to say that over time, a firm’s liquidity has increased in 
importance. Similarly, the z-score has been criticized for distorting a firm’s financial 
health because of increased R&D in firms (Franzen, Rodgers, and Simin 2007) and 
                                                          
7 Altman (1968) Z-score is calculated as 1.2 *(working capital/total assets) + 1.4 *(retained earnings/total 
assets) + 3.3 *(ebit/total assets) + 0.6 *(market value of equity/total liabilities) + 0.999 *(sales/total assets).  
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downward-biased asset valuations of current accounting rules (Hillegeist, Keating, Cram 
and Lundstedt 2004).  
Given the limitations of the z-score, I also use the debt-service ratio of a firm, 
calculated as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) 
over the sum of total short-term debt and interest. The debt-service ratio is a simpler 
measure that captures the firm’s ability to meet its current debt obligations, and as such, 
has a shorter-term focus which serves as an indicator of a firm’s more immediate trouble. 
Wu, Gaunt, and Gray (2010) analyze several measures of financial distress used in the 
literature and how they predict bankruptcy for an updated sample of firms, i.e., firms 
from a more recent period. They conclude that firms are more likely to experience 
bankruptcy if they have relatively lower profitability (earnings before interest and taxes 
to total assets), lower liquidity, and higher leverage, which are all elements captured by 
the debt-service ratio. To more easily interpret the coefficients on the distress variables, I 
take the negative value of the z-score and debt-service ratio, such that the value of the 
resulting variable increases with distress. H1 predicts the coefficient on the distress 
variable to be positive and significant.  
There is limited empirical evidence on the determinants of hiring a narcissistic 
CEO. Therefore, I include general firm control variables that often affect firm decisions 
and firm phenomena. I include financial performance (ROA) and expected growth (mtb) 
to capture current and future firm profitability. I also include R&D expenditures 
(rd_ratio) and capital expenditures (capex_ratio) to capture firm investment practices. 
Independent variables are measured as change variables from year t-2 to t-1 (where t is 
the appointment year). I also run the regressions with prior year levels of the independent 
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variables, and with both changes and prior year levels, under the assumption that changes 
in a firm’s level of distress would affect a firm differently for firms with currently low or 
already-high levels of distress. All variables are defined in detail in the Appendix. 
It may be the case that the opportunity for self-enhancement, or specifically firm 
visibility, attracts narcissistic individuals. These individuals will change the makeup of 
the applicant pool for highly visible firms, which would then increase the likelihood that 
highly visible firms will hire narcissistic individuals. I do not rule out this possibility. 
However, given that the appointment decision is with the board of directors, it is not clear 
how the visibility of the firm alone would, ex-ante, drive the board to appoint a 
narcissistic individual as CEO. For this reason, I do not formally model visibility as a 
determinant of the appointment decision.  
Table 5 reports the results of Probit regressions for specifications based on 
Equation (1). Columns 1 and 2 are models where the narcissism indicator is regressed on 
the changes variables, columns 3 and 4 are regressions using prior year levels as variables 
of interest, and columns 5 and 6 use both changes and prior year levels of variables. In 
column 2, there is a positive and significant coefficient on the change in debt-service 
ratio variable, suggesting that an increase in firm distress in the prior two years increases 
the likelihood that the firms will hire a CEO with narcissistic traits. Column 6 shows the 
same result for the change in the debt-service ratio, after controlling for the prior year 
levels of distress. This finding is consistent with hypothesis 1. There is no significant 
coefficient on the z-score variable in either set of columns. The mixed results in Table 5 
suggest that the distress variables, the z-score and the debt-service ratio, are capturing 
different elements of the firm’s financial health, such that firms with a declining ability to 
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meet short-term debt obligations are more likely to benefit from a CEO with narcissistic 
traits than firms with decreasing long-term viability. Overall, the results in Table 5 
partially support hypothesis 1.   
Post-Appointment Performance 
Post-Appointment Performance under Financial Distress 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms in distress that hire a narcissistic CEO will 
experience an improvement in future financial performance. To test this hypothesis, I use 
the following OLS regression model:  
FuturePerformance = γ0 + γ1Narcissism + γ2Distress + γ3Narcissism * Distress  
    + γ4l_ROA + γ5lnat + γ6mtb + γ7levg + ∑ γIndustryD  
    + ∑ γYearD + ε                   (2) 
I measure FuturePerformance first as the change in performance from year t-1 to 
the future aggregate ROA for years t+1 and t+2 (measured as the sum of EBITDA in year 
t+1, and t+2 divided by the average total assets for the two years). I also use the 
aggregate measure of ROA to measure future performance, and I control for prior year 
ROA in this specification. I use operating income (EBITDA) as my measure of 
performance, using the assumption that short-term actions of an incoming CEO would 
likely include cutting costs and operating expenses, rather than including revenues or 
accounts related to longer-term strategy, such as long-term investments. This assumption 
is consistent with Olsen et al. (2014) who find that CEOs who score high on narcissism 
affect future firm performance through real and operational activities. Narcissism is 
measured with the combined narcissism continuous variable (nar_sum) as described 
above. Distress is measured as in Equation (1), with either the Altman Z-Score (zscore)  
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Table 5   
Probit Regression for Appointment Decision 
        
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pred nar_bin nar_bin nar_bin nar_bin nar_bin nar_bin 
                
chg_zscore + -0.002      -0.003  
  (-0.04)      (-0.05)  
chg_debt_serv +   0.001*     0.001* 
    (1.87)     (1.95) 
chg_ROA ? -0.182 0.431    -0.600 0.226 
  (-0.14) (0.36)    (-0.42) (0.17) 
chg_mtb ? 0.000 -0.000    -0.005 -0.006 
  (0.11) (-0.08)    (-0.68) (-0.78) 
chg_rd_ratio ? -0.313 0.130    -0.515 -0.511 
  (-0.13) (0.05)    (-0.22) (-0.22) 
chg_capex_ratio ? -4.790* -4.520    -4.247 -4.016 
  (-1.69) (-1.54)    (-1.38) (-1.25) 
l_zscore +     0.014   0.047  
      (0.48)   (1.60)  
l_debt_serv +      0.000  -0.000 
       (1.19)  (-0.28) 
l_ROA ?     0.714 1.058 1.328 0.856 
      (0.72) (1.24) (1.20) (0.88) 
l_mtb ?     0.000 0.000 0.006 0.006 
      (0.51) (0.44) (0.73) (0.81) 
l_rd_ratio ?     -1.110 -0.495 -0.946 0.250 
      (-0.58) (-0.25) (-0.46) (0.12) 
l_capex_ratio ?     -3.500** -3.014* -2.974* -2.200 
      (-2.18) (-1.88) (-1.73) (-1.29) 
Constant  -0.636*** -0.635*** -0.573* -0.714** -0.614** -0.761** 
  (-2.60) (-2.61) (-1.94) (-2.42) (-1.99) (-2.45) 
           
Observations  375 368 386 386 375 368 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-
squared   0.0351 0.0414 0.0383 0.0371 0.0483 0.0489 
This table evaluates the decision to appoint a CEO with narcissistic traits using a probit model. The 
dependent variable takes a value of one if the appointed individual has a high score for narcissism, that is, 
the standardized binary picture and speech scores both equal 1, and zero otherwise. The independent 
variables are presented either as change variables, measured as the change from t-2 to t-1 or as prior year 
levels (t-1). Robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. 
 
or the debt-service ratio (debt_serv). Given the literature’s mixed results on narcissism 
and performance, I make no directional prediction for the coefficient on Narcissism itself. 
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If narcissists perform better in conditions of financial distress, I expect to see a positive 
relationship between Narcissism*Distress and future performance as H2 predicts, which 
would mean a positive and significant coefficient for the interaction of Narcissism and 
zscore or debt_serv (given they are measured such that a larger value conveys greater 
distress).   
  Results for Equation (2) are presented in Table 6. Panel A shows results for the 
regressions with the change in performance as the dependent variable. Panel B shows 
regressions with the aggregate future performance as the dependent variable. I find a 
positive and significant coefficient on nar_sum in all three regressions of Panel A and in 
two of the three regressions in Panel B. Though I do not specifically make a prediction on 
the relationship between the narcissism measure and future firm performance, these 
results are consistent with Olsen et al. (2014), in that an individual with a high narcissism 
score would benefit the short-term performance of the firm. The distress variables, zscore 
and debt_serv, both have negative and significant coefficients in Panel A, and zscore has 
a negative and significant coefficient in Panel B, indicating that higher levels of distress 
are negatively related to future firm performance, as one might expect. The variable of 
interest for H2 is the interaction of the narcissism score of a new CEO and distress of a 
firm. H2 predicts that a narcissist’s performance is affected by the level of distress of a 
firm. When narcissism is interacted with the distress variable (columns 2 and 3 in both 
panels), the signs on the interaction term coefficients are not statistically significant.  
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Table 6 
OLS Regression of Performance on Narcissism and Distress 
     
Panel A: Change in Performance 
   (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Pred chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA 
      
nar_sum ? 0.012** 0.021** 0.010* 
   (2.31) (2.15) (1.95) 
Zscore -  -0.024***  
    (-5.72)  
debt_serv -   -0.000*** 
     (-2.88) 
nar_sum * zscore +  0.004  
    (1.58)  
nar_sum * debtserv +   -0.000 
     (-0.60) 
lnat ? -0.008 0.001 -0.000 
   (-1.10) (0.27) (-0.04) 
mtb ? 0.007** 0.003 0.004 
   (2.10) (1.25) (1.53) 
levg ? 0.083 0.215*** 0.097* 
   (1.51) (8.09) (1.92) 
Constant   0.182*** -0.028 0.134*** 
   (3.36) (-0.59) (2.69) 
      
Observations   422 400 399 
R-squared   0.11 0.38 0.12 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes 
     
Panel B: Aggregate Future Performance 
   (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Pred agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA 
      
nar_sum ? 0.008* 0.019** 0.004 
   (1.78) (2.10) (1.05) 
zscore -  -0.023***  
    (-5.29)  
debt_serv -   -0.000 
     (-1.41) 
nar_sum * zscore +  0.004  
    (1.53)  
nar_sum * debtserv +   -0.000 
     (-1.28) 
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l_ROA + 1.559*** 1.094*** 1.579*** 
   (8.83) (6.59) (9.98) 
lnat ? -0.003 0.001 0.001 
   (-0.60) (0.30) (0.15) 
mtb ? 0.003 0.003 0.001 
   (1.24) (1.09) (0.58) 
levg ? 0.066 0.203*** 0.068* 
   (1.57) (6.34) (1.71) 
Constant   0.061 -0.034 0.033 
   (1.14) (-0.75) (0.60) 
      
Observations   422 400 399 
R-squared   0.63 0.69 0.60 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents OLS regression results for the effect of narcissism and distress 
on performance improvement (Panel A) or on future aggregate performance 
(Panel B). Aggregate performance is measured as the sum of EBITDA in years 
t+1, and t+2, divided by average total assets for those years. The change in 
performance is measured as the aggregate performance minus ROA in year t-1, 
where year t is the year of appointment. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
Thus, the results in Table 6 suggest that the impact of narcissism on firm performance is 
not affected by firm financial distress, as posited by H2.   
Post-Appointment Performance and Visibility 
H3 predicts that the visibility of the firm, or the opportunity for self-enhancement, 
will affect the relationship between appointing a CEO with narcissistic tendencies and 
future firm performance. I follow prior literature and proxy for a firm’s “visibility” or 
“opportunity for self-enhancement” with the number of media-mentions for a firm in the 
quarter following the quarter of appointment of the CEO (media_post) (Frederickson and 
Zolotoy 2016; Bushee and Miller 2012). To test hypothesis 3, I split the sample into two 
groups—high visibility and low visibility firms. The hi_media variable, by which the 
sample is divided, is set equal to one if the media_post value of the firm is in the top half 
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of the sample (or greater than the median), indicating higher visibility, and zero 
otherwise. I run the same regression in Equation (2) for each separate group. 
Splitting the regressions into the two groups allows us to see the differential effect 
of the variable of interest (Narcissism * Distress) for each group. While a 3-way 
interaction between narcissism, distress, and visibility in one regression would do the 
same, splitting the sample allows easier interpretation of the coefficients and allows us to 
see how the coefficients for the control variables differ between the two groups. H3 
predicts that the effect of narcissism on performance under financial distress would be 
stronger when visibility becomes a factor, and thus I expect the coefficient on the 
interaction term to be negative and significant for the group of high visibility firms, but 
not necessarily for the low visibility firms.  
Table 7 presents results for the tests of hypothesis 3. Panel A presents results for 
the regressions using the change in future performance as the dependent variable, and 
Panel B shows the regressions with the aggregate future performance measure as the 
dependent variable. Columns 1 to 3 in both panels are the regressions for the high-
visibility firms and columns 4 to 6 are the regressions for low visibility firms. First, 
looking at the regressions with only narcissism as the independent variable of interest 
(columns 1 and 4), narcissism does not, on its own, significantly affect firm performance. 
When distress variables are added, however, we see a positive and significant coefficient 
on nar_sum for low visibility firms in columns 4 and 5 of Panel A, and column 5 of Panel 
B, suggesting firm distress levels have differential effects on a narcissist’s performance 
for the two types of firms. H3 predicts a positive and significant coefficient on the 
interaction term, nar_sum*distress, for the high visibility firms, but not necessarily for  
40 
 
 
Table 7 
OLS Regression of Performance on Narcissism and Distress by Visibility 
        
Panel A: Change in Performance 
    High Visibility Low Visibility 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pred chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA 
                
nar_sum ? 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.013 0.033*** 0.016* 
   (1.22) (0.23) (0.80) (1.58) (3.06) (1.87) 
zscore -  -0.025***    -0.019***  
    (-2.98)    (-5.01)  
debt_serv -   -0.000**   0.000 
     (-2.26)   (1.01) 
nar_sum * zscore +  -0.001    0.007***  
    (-0.32)    (2.70)  
nar_sum * debtserv +   -0.000   0.000* 
     (-1.06)   (1.94) 
lnat ? -0.011 -0.002 0.000 0.007 0.006 0.015 
   (-1.01) (-0.23) (0.08) (0.41) (0.56) (0.75) 
mtb ? 0.010** 0.007* 0.006* 0.004 0.000 0.001 
   (2.06) (1.72) (1.75) (1.15) (0.11) (0.35) 
levg ? 0.134* 0.235*** 0.159** 0.071 0.202*** 0.082 
   (1.65) (3.27) (2.10) (0.89) (9.46) (1.09) 
Constant   0.176* -0.028 0.093 0.121 -0.016 0.087 
   (1.83) (-0.36) (1.50) (1.00) (-0.18) (0.64) 
          
Observations   230 216 221 191 183 177 
R-squared   0.17 0.31 0.19 0.18 0.58 0.22 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Future Aggregate Performance  
    High Visibility Low Visibility 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pred  agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA 
                
nar_sum ? 0.004 -0.000 0.002 0.009 0.033*** 0.007 
   (0.83) (-0.00) (0.43) (1.36) (3.04) (1.10) 
zscore -  -0.021***    -0.019***  
    (-2.74)    (-4.44)  
debt_serv -   -0.000*   0.000 
     (-1.83)   (1.31) 
nar_sum * zscore +  -0.002    0.007***  
    (-0.51)    (2.78)  
nar_sum * debtserv +   -0.000   0.000 
     (-1.32)   (1.15) 
41 
 
l_ROA + 1.460*** 1.190*** 1.288*** 1.660*** 1.024*** 1.856*** 
   (5.79) (5.88) (7.55) (6.68) (4.06) (9.25) 
lnat ? -0.002 0.000 0.003 0.012 0.006 0.010 
   (-0.27) (0.05) (0.63) (0.74) (0.59) (0.60) 
mtb ? 0.006* 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.002 
   (1.70) (1.54) (1.26) (0.21) (0.07) (-0.79) 
levg ? 0.131* 0.213*** 0.151** 0.046 0.199*** 0.033 
   (1.92) (3.05) (2.21) (0.79) (5.32) (0.63) 
Constant   0.031 -0.053 0.022 -0.034 -0.019 -0.038 
   (0.47) (-0.73) (0.36) (-0.30) (-0.22) (-0.31) 
          
Observations   230 216 221 191 183 177 
R-squared   0.59 0.62 0.53 0.73 0.81 0.77 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents OLS regression results for the effect of narcissism and distress on performance improvement 
(Panel A) or on future aggregate performance (Panel B) for two groups: high visibility and low visibility firms. 
Aggregate performance is measured as the sum of EBITDA in years t+1, and t+2, divided by average total assets 
for those years. The change in performance is measured as the aggregate performance minus ROA in year t-1. 
High visibility takes a value of 1 if the firm's media_post score is above the median, and zero otherwise.  Robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
the low-visibility firms, given that these firms may not offer the opportunity for self-
enhancement a narcissist seeks. The results in Table 7 show results opposite of what H3 
predicts. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant only for the 
low-visibility firms (columns 5 and 6 of Panel A, and column 5 of Panel B).  
One possible, ex-post explanation for the counterintuitive results in Table 7 can 
be attributed to task difficulty and visibility being counteracting forces on the 
performance of a narcissistic CEO. If a firm is highly visible, a narcissistic individual 
may be too focused on the publicity aspect of the job—where the importance of fulfilling 
the vanity aspect of narcissism, that is, wanting to be in the spotlight, outweighs the 
importance of tackling the difficult task at hand. In a low-visibility firm, the opportunity 
for self-enhancement is not there, and thus, the CEO can focus his or her efforts on the 
firm, where some of the positive qualities of a narcissistic individual will come through 
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for the firm in distress. Overall, the results in Table 7 partially support hypothesis 2, but 
show evidence that contradicts what hypothesis 3 predicts. 
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CHAPTER V  
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
The tests in section IV were all conducted using the combined measure of 
narcissism for the reasons discussed above. In this section, I report results for the same 
tests using the individual measures of narcissism—the picture score and the speech score. 
First, conducting the tests with only one of the measures per regression allows for a larger 
sample, increasing the tests’ power. There are 684 observations with a picture score 
available and 824 observations with a speech measure available, compared to 549 
observations that have both. Second, running the same tests with each individual measure 
allows us to see whether one aspect of the combined measure is driving the primary 
results.   
Tables 8-10 replicate Tables 5-7, but use each of the individual measures of 
narcissism. Table 8 reports the results for the probit regression model to test hypothesis 1. 
Panel A reports the results using only the picture binary measure (pic_bin) and Panel B 
reports the results using the speech measure of narcissism (speech_bin). In both panels, 
the variables of interest—the change in z-score and debt-service ratio and the prior year 
levels of each—are not significant. Together, Panels A and B of this table tell us that it is 
not only one of the individual measures of narcissism that drives the results in Table 5 
and that the two individual measures reflect different elements of narcissism.  
Table 9 presents results for the OLS regression of future firm performance, as 
measured by the change in ROA (Panel A) or aggregate ROA (Panel B), on the 
interaction of narcissism and distress, where narcissism is measured either by the picture  
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Table 8 
Probit Regression for Appointment Decision (Individual Measures) 
        
Panel A: Probit Regression Using Picture Measure of Narcissism     
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pred pic_bin pic_bin pic_bin pic_bin pic_bin pic_bin 
                
chg_zscore + 0.009      0.016  
  (0.43)      (0.68)  
chg_debt_serv +   -0.000     -0.000 
    (-0.52)     (-0.65) 
chg_ROA ? -1.365 -1.360    -1.643 -1.680 
  (-1.31) (-1.30)    (-1.46) (-1.55) 
chg_mtb ? -0.002 -0.002    0.004 0.004 
  (-1.52) (-1.54)    (0.78) (0.74) 
chg_rd_ratio ? -0.848 -0.798    -1.743 -1.935 
  (-0.49) (-0.45)    (-1.09) (-1.21) 
chg_capex_ratio ? 1.958 2.657    2.134 2.389 
  (0.89) (1.06)    (0.93) (0.92) 
l_zscore +     -0.004   0.006  
      (-0.21)   (0.30)  
l_debt_serv +      -0.000  0.000 
       (-0.38)  (0.46) 
l_ROA ?     0.781 1.382** 1.674* 1.998*** 
      (1.02) (2.04) (1.95) (2.68) 
l_mtb ?     -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 
      (-1.35) (-1.37) (-1.11) (-1.06) 
l_rd_ratio ?     -1.352 -1.426 -0.924 -0.589 
      (-0.84) (-0.84) (-0.53) (-0.31) 
l_capex_ratio ?     0.245 0.411 -1.077 -0.494 
      (0.20) (0.32) (-0.80) (-0.37) 
Constant  0.231 0.233 0.105 0.001 0.034 -0.071 
  (1.12) (1.13) (0.43) (0.00) (0.14) (-0.28) 
           
Observations  487 478 501 503 487 478 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared   0.0421 0.0360 0.0386 0.0387 0.0492 0.0460 
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Panel B: Probit Regression Using Speech Measure of Narcissism     
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pred 
speech_ 
bin 
speech_ 
bin 
speech_ 
bin 
speech_ 
bin 
speech_ 
bin 
speech_ 
bin 
                
chg_zscore + -0.005      -0.000  
  (-0.29)      (-0.02)  
chg_debt_serv +   -0.000     -0.000 
    (-1.63)     (-1.23) 
chg_ROA ? 0.355 0.392    0.673 0.564 
  (0.58) (0.67)    (0.97) (0.88) 
chg_mtb ? -0.000 -0.000    -0.004 -0.004 
  (-0.07) (-0.01)    (-0.81) (-0.71) 
chg_rd_ratio ? 1.682 1.593    1.998 1.673 
  (1.13) (1.04)    (1.26) (1.07) 
chg_capex_ratio ? -1.316 -2.279    -0.986 -1.852 
  (-0.69) (-1.15)    (-0.49) (-0.88) 
l_zscore +     -0.001   -0.004  
      (-0.06)   (-0.28)  
l_debt_serv +      -0.000  0.000 
       (-1.09)  (0.56) 
l_ROA ?     0.216 0.398 -0.051 0.286 
      (0.36) (0.71) (-0.08) (0.50) 
l_mtb ?     0.001 0.001 0.005 0.004 
      (0.63) (0.62) (0.86) (0.76) 
l_rd_ratio ?     -0.759 -0.518 -1.329 -0.801 
      (-0.71) (-0.46) (-1.19) (-0.70) 
l_capex_ratio ?     -1.234 -1.533 -0.721 -0.995 
      (-1.12) (-1.36) (-0.60) (-0.82) 
Constant  -0.309* -0.309* -0.310 -0.327 -0.300 -0.329 
  (-1.67) (-1.67) (-1.51) (-1.58) (-1.44) (-1.57) 
           
Observations  655 631 675 665 655 631 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared   0.0137 0.0148 0.0144 0.0148 0.0164 0.0171 
This table evaluates the decision to appoint a CEO with narcissistic traits using a probit model. The 
dependent variable takes a value of one if the appointed CEO's photo score is greater than or equal to 3, 
and zero otherwise (Panel A, pic_bin) or takes a value of one if the appointed CEO's pronoun ratio score is 
greater than the mean, and zero otherwise (Panel B, speech_bin). The independent variables are presented 
either as change variables, measured as the change from t-2 to t-1 or as prior year levels (t-1). Robust z-
statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. 
 
score (pic_avg) or the speech score (pnoun_ratio) and distress is measured either with a 
firm’s z-score or debt-service ratio. In Panel A, columns 1 and 3 show a positive and 
significant coefficient on pic_avg, whereas only column 5 shows significance on the  
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Table 9 
OLS Regression of Performance on Narcissism and Distress (Individual Measures) 
        
Panel A: Change in Performance  
  Picture Measure Speech Measure 
 Pred (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Sign chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA 
          
pic_avg ? 0.020*** 0.020 0.014**    
  (2.96) (1.38) (2.22)    
pnoun_ratio ?      0.057 0.364*** 0.030 
       (0.98) (2.71) (0.51) 
zscore -   -0.027***    -0.043***  
    (-3.03)    (-4.30)  
debt_serv -    -0.000   0.000 
     (-0.20)   (0.34) 
pic_avg * zscore +   0.003      
    (0.78)      
pic_avg * debtserv +    -0.000    
     (-0.29)    
pnoun_ratio * zscore +       0.104***  
        (3.21)  
pnoun_ratio * debtserv +        -0.000 
         (-0.66) 
lnat ? -0.009 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.008 0.010 
  (-1.48) (0.28) (-0.21) (0.73) (1.51) (1.47) 
mtb ? 0.005* 0.002 0.002 0.007** 0.004 0.006* 
  (1.81) (0.84) (1.11) (2.34) (1.56) (1.89) 
levg ? 0.078 0.197*** 0.100** 0.049 0.169*** 0.073 
  (1.61) (7.15) (2.25) (0.88) (3.72) (1.32) 
Constant  0.151*** -0.039 0.108** 0.047 -0.148** 0.020 
  (2.99) (-0.61) (2.12) (0.78) (-1.97) (0.32) 
          
Observations  539 509 509 698 665 652 
R-squared  0.10 0.30 0.11 0.08 0.25 0.09 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                
Panel B: Aggregate Future Performance  
  Picture Measure Speech Measure 
 Pred (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Sign agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA 
          
pic_avg ? 0.014** 0.018 0.007    
  (2.19) (1.31) (1.22)    
pnoun_ratio ?      0.045 0.319** 0.005 
       (0.88) (2.45) (0.10) 
zscore -   
-
0.025***    -0.037***  
47 
 
    (-2.87)    (-3.59)  
debt_serv -    0.000   0.000 
     (0.49)   (0.82) 
pic_avg * zscore +   0.003      
    (0.74)      
pic_avg * debtserv +    -0.000    
     (-0.91)    
pnoun_ratio * zscore +       0.092***  
        (2.94)  
pnoun_ratio * debtserv +        -0.000 
         (-1.00) 
l_ROA + 1.476*** 1.107*** 1.441*** 1.501*** 1.220*** 1.489*** 
  (9.32) (7.19) (9.80) (12.39) (9.75) (13.43) 
lnat ? -0.007 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.006 0.005 
  (-1.25) (0.24) (-0.27) (0.38) (1.19) (0.98) 
mtb ? 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.003 
  (0.97) (0.67) (0.37) (1.41) (1.25) (1.11) 
levg ? 0.068* 0.186*** 0.080** 0.067* 0.156*** 0.081** 
  (1.79) (5.85) (2.17) (1.96) (3.72) (2.42) 
Constant  0.070 -0.042 0.054 0.003 -0.137* -0.009 
  (1.30) (-0.67) (0.97) (0.05) (-1.82) (-0.15) 
          
Observations  539 509 509 698 665 652 
R-squared  0.58 0.62 0.55 0.56 0.60 0.55 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents OLS regression results for the effect of narcissism (as measured by picture score or speech score) and 
distress on performance improvement (Panel A) or on future aggregate performance (Panel B). Aggregate performance is 
measured as the sum of EBITDA in years t+1, and t+2, divided by average total assets for those years. The change in 
performance is measured as the aggregate performance minus ROA in year t-1, where year t is the year of appointment. 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
coefficient on pnoun_ratio, indicating that in the case of looking only at the narcissism 
score coefficient, the picture score could be the primary driver for the effect of narcissism 
on the change in performance. When looking at the interaction terms, the z-score measure 
interacted with the speech score has a positive and significant coefficient (columns 5), 
and neither variable of interest has a significant coefficient picture score regressions 
(columns 2 and 3). Thus, results in Panel A show weak evidence that a high-narcissism-
scoring CEO will improve the performance of firms in distress. Panel B results are 
consistent with Panel A in that the coefficient for the interaction term using the speech 
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measure of narcissism and zscore is positive and significant, but no other variable of 
interest is significant. These results show that the speech measure of narcissism 
potentially carries more weight when looking at the effect of narcissism on firm 
performance, but these results (together with those in Table 8) suggest that neither the 
picture alone nor the speech measure alone capture the essence of narcissism as a whole.  
Table 10 replicates the tests conducted in Table 7 using the individual measures 
of narcissism. In these tests, I examine whether the effect of narcissism and distress on 
future firm performance varies by the opportunity for self-enhancement, as proxied by 
firm visibility. Panels A and B show regressions where the change in ROA is the 
dependent variable. Panels C and D show regressions where the aggregate future ROA is 
the dependent variable. The results in Table 10 are generally consistent with, but weaker 
than, Table 7 results. The interaction terms using the z-score measure have positive and 
significant coefficients in the low visibility firms, but only in the regressions using the 
speech measure of narcissism, suggesting that results in Table 7 are primarily driven by 
the speech measure of narcissism. Altogether, the mixed results in Tables 8-10 for the 
individual measures of narcissism (picture score and speech score) further suggest that a 
combined measure of narcissism is the best for capturing the whole of what could be a 
narcissistic individual, and thus, is most appropriate for the tests of the hypotheses above. 
  
49 
 
Table 10 
OLS Regression of Performance on Narcissism and Distress by Visibility 
        
Panel A: Change in Performance Using Picture Measure of Narcissism 
   High Visibility Low Visibility 
 Pred (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Sign chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA 
          
pic_avg ? 0.017* 0.010 0.009 0.022** 0.014 0.023*** 
   (1.92) (0.78) (1.12) (2.32) (0.70) (2.69) 
zscore -  -0.013    -0.027**  
    (-1.24)    (-2.56)  
debt_serv -   0.000   -0.000* 
     (0.50)   (-1.75) 
pic_avg * zscore +  -0.001    0.001  
    (-0.19)    (0.24)  
pic_avg * debtserv +   -0.000   0.000 
     (-0.91)   (1.44) 
lnat ? -0.009 0.006 0.001 -0.010 -0.002 0.000 
   (-1.06) (0.84) (0.24) (-0.67) (-0.16) (0.00) 
mtb ? 0.007* 0.004 0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
   (1.92) (1.57) (1.57) (0.50) (-0.47) (-0.19) 
levg ? 0.132** 0.222*** 0.162*** 0.060 0.194*** 0.075 
   (2.03) (3.51) (2.61) (0.80) (7.41) (1.07) 
Constant   0.132 -0.052 0.063 0.187* -0.018 0.123 
   (1.61) (-0.74) (0.97) (1.76) (-0.17) (1.03) 
          
Observations   290 272 277 248 236 231 
R-squared   0.14 0.24 0.16 0.14 0.43 0.18 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Panel B: Change in Performance Using Speech Measure of Narcissism 
   High Visibility Low Visibility 
 Pred (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Sign chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA chg_ROA 
          
pnoun_ratio ? 0.026 0.203 0.012 0.087 0.291** 0.050 
   (0.41) (1.27) (0.20) (0.79) (2.17) (0.40) 
zscore -  -0.021    -0.049***  
    (-1.35)    (-4.93)  
debt_serv -   0.000   -0.000 
     (0.83)   (-0.51) 
pnoun_ratio * zscore +  0.056    0.087***  
    (1.19)    (3.28)  
pnoun_ratio * debtserv +   -0.001   0.000 
     (-1.12)   (0.30) 
lnat ? -0.006 0.000 -0.001 0.033** 0.022** 0.043** 
   (-0.80) (0.00) (-0.12) (2.01) (1.99) (2.47) 
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mtb ? 0.005* 0.004** 0.003* 0.010* 0.004 0.008 
   (1.91) (1.97) (1.77) (1.79) (0.75) (1.45) 
levg ? 0.092 0.148** 0.117** 0.036 0.226*** 0.063 
   (1.61) (2.41) (2.13) (0.43) (5.92) (0.78) 
Constant   0.151** 0.020 0.109* -0.137 -0.290*** -0.194 
   (2.02) (0.24) (1.90) (-1.11) (-2.68) (-1.41) 
          
Observations   364 347 341 333 317 310 
R-squared   0.11 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.43 0.17 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Panel C: Future Aggregate Performance Using Picture Measure of Narcissism 
   High Visibility Low Visibility 
 Pred (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Sign agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA 
          
pic_avg ? 0.013 0.007 0.007 0.018** 0.014 0.016* 
   (1.57) (0.52) (0.88) (2.12) (0.71) (1.89) 
zscore -  -0.009    -0.026**  
    (-0.87)    (-2.54)  
debt_serv -   0.000   -0.000 
     (0.67)   (-0.90) 
pic_avg * zscore +  -0.002    0.001  
    (-0.37)    (0.24)  
pic_avg * debtserv +   -0.000   0.000 
     (-1.05)   (1.11) 
l_ROA + 1.374*** 1.186*** 1.190*** 1.581*** 1.056*** 1.711*** 
   (5.89) (5.65) (7.59) (6.80) (4.36) (8.50) 
lnat ? -0.003 0.007 0.003 -0.011 -0.002 -0.009 
   (-0.59) (1.13) (0.56) (-0.74) (-0.19) (-0.57) 
mtb ? 0.005* 0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
   (1.80) (1.48) (1.34) (-0.34) (-0.49) (-0.96) 
levg ? 0.131** 0.207*** 0.157*** 0.041 0.187*** 0.036 
   (2.23) (3.27) (2.65) (0.73) (4.68) (0.70) 
Constant   0.028 -0.074 0.022 0.089 -0.020 0.069 
   (0.44) (-1.10) (0.35) (0.84) (-0.18) (0.59) 
          
Observations   290 272 277 248 236 231 
R-squared   0.55 0.58 0.49 0.65 0.70 0.67 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Panel D: Future Aggregate Performance Using Speech Measure of Narcissism 
   High Visibility Low Visibility 
 Pred (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Sign agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA agg_ROA 
          
pnoun_ratio ? 0.025 0.136 0.007 0.053 0.289** -0.017 
   (0.43) (1.04) (0.12) (0.57) (2.09) (-0.17) 
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zscore -  -0.014    -0.049***  
    (-1.14)    (-4.42)  
debt_serv -   0.000   0.000 
     (0.99)   (0.32) 
pnoun_ratio * zscore +  0.037    0.086***  
    (1.01)    (3.19)  
pnoun_ratio * debtserv +   -0.001   -0.000 
     (-1.23)   (-0.34) 
l_ROA + 1.345*** 1.271*** 1.184*** 1.582*** 1.015*** 1.661*** 
   (7.24) (7.49) (9.66) (10.00) (6.24) (12.35) 
lnat ? -0.004 -0.000 -0.001 0.023 0.022* 0.027* 
   (-0.62) (-0.01) (-0.11) (1.64) (1.87) (1.84) 
mtb ? 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.004 
   (1.61) (1.60) (1.38) (1.02) (0.74) (0.76) 
levg ? 0.101** 0.133** 0.117** 0.060 0.225*** 0.079** 
   (2.03) (2.40) (2.25) (1.32) (5.13) (1.97) 
Constant   0.078 0.010 0.080 -0.124 -0.289** -0.134 
   (1.35) (0.13) (1.40) (-1.13) (-2.55) (-1.16) 
          
Observations   364 347 341 333 317 310 
R-squared   0.53 0.52 0.48 0.62 0.70 0.64 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents OLS regression results for the effect of narcissism (as measured by either picture score or speech 
score) and distress on performance improvement (Panels A and B) or on future aggregate performance (Panels C and 
D) for two groups: high visibility and low visibility firms. Aggregate performance is measured as the sum of EBITDA 
in years t+1, and t+2, divided by average total assets for those years. The change in performance is measured as the 
aggregate performance minus ROA in year t-1. High visibility takes a value of 1 if the firm's media_post score is 
above the median, and zero otherwise.  Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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CHAPTER VI  
CONCLUSION 
In this study, I find modest evidence to support the hypothesis that firms which 
are approaching financial distress, that is, firms with decreasing debt-service ratios 
(increasing distress) in the years leading up to turnover are more likely to hire a 
narcissistic CEO. The lack of results for the z-score measure of distress may suggest that 
the measures of distress are capturing different elements of a firm’s financial health, 
which is consistent with the literature examining these distress measures. Further, I 
examine the future performance of the turnover firms. I find evidence that firms under 
distress that appoint a CEO with narcissistic traits experience improvement in future firm 
performance, but only if the firm is not a highly visible firm, suggesting a tradeoff 
between a narcissistic CEO’s ability to perform in an environment of distress and 
uncertainty and his or her need for self-enhancement.  
The literature has studied the relationship between narcissism and performance 
and has found both negative and positive effects of narcissistic executives on a firm. The 
psychology literature suggests that under certain conditions, such as chaotic and stressful 
environments, and conditions under which the narcissist’s performance has high 
visibility, narcissists tend to thrive and outperform non-narcissists. Broadly, my paper 
contributes to the literature following upper echelon’s theory, which highlights the 
importance of specific manager characteristics and their effects on firm outcomes. More 
specifically, my study adds to the empirical literature supporting Finkelstein et al.’s 
(2009) “fit-drift/shift-refit” theory by examining whether firms under financial distress 
are more likely to appoint a narcissist as CEO. Further, by establishing that different 
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characteristics of the firm affect the relationship between narcissism and firm 
performance, we can better understand the different outcomes that have been found in 
prior literature. If boards match newly appointed narcissists to their firm’s current needs, 
but these CEOs become entrenched (as narcissists may tend to do) while the firm’s needs 
drift or shift over time, then we can see how fit-drift/shift-refit theory would explain not 
only the appointment of narcissists under these specific contexts, but also why the 
literature shows positive as well as negative firm outcomes over a longer time period of 
time. 
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APPENDIX 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Definition 
Narcissism Measures 
nar_sum Sum of the standardized picture score (pic_avg) and speech score (pnoun_ratio). 
nar_bin Binary variable equal to 1 if both the standardized picture score and standardized 
speech score are greater than the mean of zero, and zero otherwise. 
pic_avg Average CEO's photo score for two annual reports. The two annual reports do not 
include the first annual report in which the new CEO appears. The photo score for 
each year is based on the following scale: (1) No photograph of the CEO is present; 
(2) The CEO is photographed with other executives, board members, or employees of 
the firm; (3) The CEO is photographed alone, and the photograph takes up less than 
half of the page; (4) The CEO is photographed alone, and the photograph takes up at 
least half of the page, with text taking up some space on the page; (5) The CEO is 
photographed alone, and the photograph takes up the entire page. 
pic_bin Binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO's photo score (pic_avg) is 3 or higher, and zero 
otherwise 
pnoun_ratio The ratio of singular personal pronouns (e.g., I, my, mine, etc.) to all personal 
pronouns (e.g., I, my, mine, we, our, ours, etc.) in the CEO's spoken portion of Q&A 
section of the firm's conference call transcript.  
speech_bin Binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO's speech score (pnoun_ratio) is higher than the 
mean, and zero otherwise. 
Distress Measures 
debt_serv Debt service ratio, measure of financial distress, calculated as the negative of 
ebitda/(total short term debt + interest); increases in financial distress. 
zscore Altman (1968) Z-score, measure of financial distress, calculated as the negative of 1.2 
*(working capital/total assets) + 1.4 *(retained earnings/total assets) + 3.3 *(ebit/total 
assets) + 0.6 *(market value of equity/total liabilities) + 0.999 *(sales/total assets); 
increases in financial distress. 
Visibility Measures 
media_post Number of firm media mentions in the quarter following the quarter in which the new 
CEO was appointed. 
media_pre Number of firm media mentions in the quarter preceding the quarter in which the new 
CEO was appointed. 
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Performance and Control Variables 
agg_ROA Aggregate future ROA, calculated as (ROAt+1 + ROAt+2)/[(at t+1 + att+2)/2] 
chg_ROA Change in ROA, calculated as agg_ROA minus ROAt-1 
at Total assets. 
capex_ratio Capital expenditures ratio, calculated as capital expenditures/total assets. 
chg_variable Change of the variable from year t-2 to t-1. 
ebitda Earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation; proxy for operating income. 
epspi Basic earnings per share, including extraordinary items. 
ib Income before extraordinary items. 
l_variable Lagged variable, t-1. 
levg Leverage, calculated as (total short term debt + total long term debt)/total assets. 
mkvalt Market value of equity. 
mtb Market to book ratio, calculated as mkvalt/book equity. 
rd_ratio Research and development ratio, calculated as R&D expenditures/total assets. 
ROA Return on assets, calculated as ebitda/total assets. 
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